Sandbox vs Tool Policy vs Elevated
Clawdia has three related (but different) controls:- Sandbox (
agents.defaults.sandbox.*/agents.list[].sandbox.*) decides where tools run (Docker vs host). - Tool policy (
tools.*,tools.sandbox.tools.*,agents.list[].tools.*) decides which tools are available/allowed. - Elevated (
tools.elevated.*,agents.list[].tools.elevated.*) is an exec-only escape hatch to run on the host when you’re sandboxed.
Quick debug
Use the inspector to see what Clawdia is actually doing:- effective sandbox mode/scope/workspace access
- whether the session is currently sandboxed (main vs non-main)
- effective sandbox tool allow/deny (and whether it came from agent/global/default)
- elevated gates and fix-it key paths
Sandbox: where tools run
Sandboxing is controlled byagents.defaults.sandbox.mode:
"off": everything runs on the host."non-main": only non-main sessions are sandboxed (common “surprise” for groups/channels)."all": everything is sandboxed.
Bind mounts (security quick check)
docker.bindspierces the sandbox filesystem: whatever you mount is visible inside the container with the mode you set (:roor:rw).- Default is read-write if you omit the mode; prefer
:rofor source/secrets. scope: "shared"ignores per-agent binds (only global binds apply).- Binding
/var/run/docker.sockeffectively hands host control to the sandbox; only do this intentionally. - Workspace access (
workspaceAccess: "ro"/"rw") is independent of bind modes.
Tool policy: which tools exist/are callable
Two layers matter:- Tool profile:
tools.profileandagents.list[].tools.profile(base allowlist) - Provider tool profile:
tools.byProvider[provider].profileandagents.list[].tools.byProvider[provider].profile - Global/per-agent tool policy:
tools.allow/tools.denyandagents.list[].tools.allow/agents.list[].tools.deny - Provider tool policy:
tools.byProvider[provider].allow/denyandagents.list[].tools.byProvider[provider].allow/deny - Sandbox tool policy (only applies when sandboxed):
tools.sandbox.tools.allow/tools.sandbox.tools.denyandagents.list[].tools.sandbox.tools.*
denyalways wins.- If
allowis non-empty, everything else is treated as blocked. Provider tool keys accept eitherprovider(e.g.google-antigravity) orprovider/model(e.g.openai/gpt-5.2).
Tool groups (shorthands)
Tool policies (global, agent, sandbox) supportgroup:* entries that expand to multiple tools:
group:runtime:exec,bash,processgroup:fs:read,write,edit,apply_patchgroup:sessions:sessions_list,sessions_history,sessions_send,sessions_spawn,session_statusgroup:memory:memory_search,memory_getgroup:ui:browser,canvasgroup:automation:cron,gatewaygroup:messaging:messagegroup:nodes:nodesgroup:clawdia: all built-in Clawdia tools (excludes provider plugins)
Elevated: exec-only “run on host”
Elevated does not grant extra tools; it only affectsexec.
- If you’re sandboxed,
/elevated on(orexecwithelevated: true) runs on the host (approvals may still apply). - Use
/elevated fullto skip exec approvals for the session. - If you’re already running direct, elevated is effectively a no-op (still gated).
- Elevated is not skill-scoped and does not override tool allow/deny.
- Enablement:
tools.elevated.enabled(and optionallyagents.list[].tools.elevated.enabled) - Sender allowlists:
tools.elevated.allowFrom.<provider>(and optionallyagents.list[].tools.elevated.allowFrom.<provider>)
Common “sandbox jail” fixes
“Tool X blocked by sandbox tool policy”
Fix-it keys (pick one):- Disable sandbox:
agents.defaults.sandbox.mode=off(or per-agentagents.list[].sandbox.mode=off) - Allow the tool inside sandbox:
- remove it from
tools.sandbox.tools.deny(or per-agentagents.list[].tools.sandbox.tools.deny) - or add it to
tools.sandbox.tools.allow(or per-agent allow)
- remove it from
“I thought this was main, why is it sandboxed?”
In"non-main" mode, group/channel keys are not main. Use the main session key (shown by sandbox explain) or switch mode to "off".